Fitz-John Porter, Scapegoat of Second Manassas: The Rise, Fall and Rise of the General Accused of Disobedience, by Donald R. Jermann. McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2009. $39.95 (www.mcfarlandpub.com, 800-253-2187), 295 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-0-7864-3930-0. 2009.

To this reviewer the title of Donald R. Jermann’s Fitz-John Porter, Scapegoat of Second Manassas: The Rise, Fall and Rise of the General Accused of Disobedience, implies the book is military biography. Yet, the preface says otherwise. Here, Jermann makes it clear “this work is note a mere recounting of events, and not just a biography of General Porter.” (1). More succinctly it is an examination of what Jermann  calls the court martial of century. How did the Battle of Second Manassas lead to this proceeding and what was the outcome. Fitz-John Porter is at the heart of the story, but very little biographical is provided.

Porter was a rising star within the Army of the Potomac. He led a division at the beginning of the Peninsula Campaign, gave a good account of himself, and was then promoted to major general of volunteers by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. Porter now commanded Fifth Corps, but an alliance with the largely unpopular McClellan would soon doom Porter’s career.

In late August McClellan sent Porter to reinforce Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia, who was following Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  It was inevitable they would again class at Manassas and this is where the story turns ugly. During what became the Second Battle of Bull Run on August 29, 1862, Porter’s corps was ordered by Pope to attack the Confederate right held by Maj. Gen Stonewall Jackson.  But Pope was unaware that Confederate Maj. Gen. James Longstreet corps had arrived to support Jackson's position. Porter received intelligence that told him of the Confederate strength and refused Pope’s orders to attack.

The next day Pope again ordered the flank attack, and Porter reluctantly complied. As Fifth Corps turned to head towards Jackson's right and attacked, Longstreet's troops were waiting. About 30,000 Confederates overran Porter's 5,000 or so men and drove through them and into the rest of Pope's forces. Porter’s worst fears were realized. Pope blamed Porter for the defeat, and accused him of insubordination.  Pope relieved him of his command on September 5.

Porter was soon restored to command of the corps by McClellan and led it through the Maryland Campaign in a reserve position during the Battle of Antietam. On November 25, 1862, Porter was arrested and court-martialed for his performance at Second Manassas. McClellan could not come to his rescue since he had been relieved by President Lincoln after Antietam. According to Jermann, Porter's association with the disgraced McClellan and his open criticism of Pope were significant reasons for his conviction at court-martial.  Porter was found guilty on January 10, 1863, of disobedience and misconduct, and he was dismissed from the Army eleven days later.

After the war ended, Porter was offered a command in the Egyptian Army but declined it, ]and spent most of the remainder of his life fighting against this injustice. In 1878, a special commission under General John M. Schofield exonerated Porter by finding that his reluctance to attack Longstreet probably saved Pope's Army of Virginia from an even greater defeat. Eight years later, President Chester A. Arthur reversed Porter's sentence and a special act of the U.S. Congress restored Porter's commission as an infantry colonel in the U.S. Army, backdated to May 14, 1861, but without any back pay due. Two days later, August 7, 1886, Porter, vindicated, retired from the Army at his own request.

Jermann tells the story of the court-martial well and his own career as an Army officer allows him to provide useful insight that a typical Civil War historian might not have.  The main criticism of Fitz-John Porter, Scapegoat of Second Manassas: The Rise, Fall and Rise of the General Accused of Disobedience is the lack of sources to back up his commentary.  His source notes mainly cite the Official Records (OR), even though the book contains a full bibliography of other primary and secondary works.  Despite this minor oversight Jermann’s book will serve as very useful work of reference for those wishing to gain an understanding of how the Union Army functioned, or didn’t function during the first two years of the war.  Those seeking a biography of Porter should look elsewhere.

Mitchell Yockelson
National Archives and Records Admnistration